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NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
                    
                                                              No. 05-1490
                    
                    
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
                                                       
v.
CURTIS SANFORD
                                                            a/k/a HASSEN,
                                                                           Curtis Sanford,
                                                         Appellant
                                             
                                        On Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Western District of Pennsylvania
(D.C. Crim. No. 03-cr-00015J)
Honorable David Stewart Cercone, District Judge
                    
Submitted under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)
March 7, 2006
BEFORE:  ROTH and GREENBERG, Circuit Judges, and
BUCKWALTER, District Judge*
                                                       (Filed: April 5, 2006)
                           
*Honorable Ronald L. Buckwalter, Senior Judge of the United States District Court for     
  the Eastern District of Pennsylvania, sitting by designation.
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OPINION 
                                
BUCKWALTER, Senior District Judge.
Curtis Sanford a/k/a Hassen (“Sanford”) appeals from his conviction on two
counts of knowingly, intentionally, and unlawfully distributing less than five (5) grams of
a mixture and substance containing a detectable amount of cocaine base in the form
commonly known as “crack,” a Schedule II controlled substance, in violation of 21
U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1) and 841(b)(1)(C). 
Sanford raises three issues in his appeal from his conviction: 
1.  Whether the District Court properly admitted into evidence
Agent Zacur’s and Detective Price’s preliminary hearing and in-
court identifications of Sanford because the identification
procedures were not unduly suggestive and, even if they had
been, circumstances surrounding the officers’ initial
observations of Sanford survived the totality of circumstances
test?
2.  Whether Sanford enjoyed the full exercise of his
constitutional right to present a defense when the District Court:
1) admitted relevant testimony from . . . Sanford’s expert
witness on six areas that impact eyewitness identification
accuracy; and, 2) excluded testimony regarding a Department of
Justice research report containing suggested procedures for
obtaining eyewitness identifications because Sanford failed to
provide notice of the testimony and the testimony was
irrelevant?
3.  Whether the District Court acted within its discretion when
it denied Sanford’s request for a jury view of the crime scene
      As we write this opinion for the parties, the fact section will be omitted.1
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because both parties presented ample evidence of the crime
scene for the jury to make an informed decision regarding
Detective Price’s ability to identify Sanford from his vantage
point?
(Appellant’s Br. at 3-4).  We discuss each issue in the order presented.1
I.   Agent Zacur’s and Detective Price’s Identification
Sanford argues that the District Court improperly denied his motion to
suppress Agent Zacur’s and Detective Price’s preliminary hearing and in-court
identifications of Sanford.  We “review[] the [D]istrict [C]ourt’s denial of the motion to
suppress for clear error as to the underlying facts, but exercise[] plenary review as to its
legality in light of the courts’s properly found facts.” United States v. Givan, 320 F.3d
452, 458 (3d Cir. 2003) (internal quotations omitted) (citations omitted).
A pretrial identification procedure violates a defendant’s due process rights
when it creates a substantial risk of misidentification.  United States v. Emanuele, 51 F.3d
1123, 1128 (3d Cir. 1995).  A two-step approach is utilized to determine whether, under
the totality of circumstances, an out-of-court identification procedure violated a
defendant’s rights to due process.  First, the defendant must demonstrate that the
procedure in question was impermissibly or unnecessarily suggestive.  United States v.
Lawrence, 349 F.3d 109, 115 (3d Cir. 2003) (citing Reese v. Fulcomer, 946 F.2d 247, 259
(3d Cir. 1991)).  If the defendant overcomes this burden, the court then assesses the
reliability and admissibility of the out-of-court identification under the totality of the
      We also note that Agent Zacur’s and Detective Price’s identifications would survive2
the Biggers totality of the circumstances analysis.  Agent Zacur met with Sanford face-to-
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circumstances.  Reese, 946 F.2d at 259.  The following five factors must be weighed in
conducting the totality of the circumstances analysis: (1) the opportunity of the witness to
view the defendant at the time of the crime; (2) the degree of attention of the witness; (3)
the accuracy of any witness' prior description of the criminal by the witness; (4) the
witness’ level of certainty at the pre-trial identification; and, (5) the amount of time
between the crime and the pre-trial identification.  Neil v. Biggers, 409 U.S. 188, 199-200
(1972). 
After holding a Suppression Hearing regarding Sanford’s motion to
suppress pretrial and in-court identifications on December 9, 2003, the District Court
made findings of fact and denied Sanford’s motion in a memorandum and order of
January 26, 2004.  
First, we conclude that the District Court’s findings of fact are not clearly
erroneous as they are supported by the record.  Second, based on the District Court’s
findings, we believe Sanford has failed to overcome his initial burden of proving that the
preliminary hearing identification procedure was unduly suggestive.  Based on the
District Court’s findings, Agent Zacur and Detective Price made their identifications at a
preliminary hearing, and Sanford and his counsel had full opportunity to cross examine
Agent Zacur and Detective Price at that hearing.  Clearly, the preliminary hearing
identification procedure was not impermissibly suggestive.  2
face in a well-lit apartment on two occasions; Agent Zacur made a concerted effort to
study Sanford in their meetings, knowing he would have to identify Sanford in a future
proceeding; Agent Zacur observed Sanford on a third occasion in a well-lit Sheetz
parking lot; Agent Zacur recorded a description of Hassen after their first meeting and the
description matched Sanford’s; and Agent Zacur identified Sanford with certainty at the
preliminary hearing.  With respect to Detective Price, he observed Sanford through the
apartment window on October 29, 2002; Detective Price watched Sanford at the Sheetz
parking lot on October 30, 2002; and Detective Sheetz identified Sanford with certainty at
the preliminary hearing.  Therefore, the identifications would survive the totality of the
circumstances analysis.
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II.   Exclusion of Department of Justice Research
Sanford claims that the District Court violated his Sixth Amendment
constitutional right to present a defense by excluding testimony regarding a Department
of Justice (“DOJ”) research report, entitled “Eyewitness Evidence: A Guide for Law
Enforcement, Research Report,” which detailed guidelines and procedures for dealing
with eyewitness identifications.  With respect to our standard of review, it is plenary
when determining whether a defendant’s Sixth Amendment right has been violated. 
United States v. Tyler, 164 F.3d 150, 156 (3d Cir. 1998) (citation omitted).  However, we
note that a circuit court “generally review[s] decisions of a district court concerning the
admission and exclusion of evidence for abuse-of-discretion.”  Rineheimer v. Cemcolift,
Inc., 292 F.3d 375, 382-83 (3d Cir. 2002).
To establish that the exclusion of Dr. Jonathan Schooler’s testimony
concerning the DOJ research report violated his Sixth Amendment right to present a
defense, Sanford must prove: “First, that he was deprived of the opportunity to present
evidence in his favor; second, that the excluded testimony would have been material and
6favorable to his defense; and third, that the deprivation was arbitrary or disproportionate
to any legitimate evidentiary or procedural purpose.”  Gov’t of Virgin Islands v. Mills,
956 F.2d 443, 446 (3d Cir. 1992) (citing Rock v. Arkansas, 483 U.S. 44, 56 (1987)).
Sanford offered Dr. Schooler as an expert to testify regarding the potential
inaccuracies of Agent Zacur’s and Detective Price’s identifications.  Before trial, after
hearing argument from the parties, the District Court denied the government’s motion for
a Daubert hearing with respect to Dr. Schooler’s testimony and decided to allow Dr.
Schooler to testify with respect to the following areas: “1) cross-racial identification; 2)
distance of the perpetrator; 3) exposure to suggestive sources; 4) exposure between
encoding and test; 5) the effects of delay; 6) the effect of multiple witness identifications;
and 7) the relationship between confidence and accuracy.” (App. 24.)
At trial, Dr. Schooler testified only with respect to the areas permitted by
the District Court.  During direct examination, Sanford attempted to question Dr.
Schooler regarding the DOJ report.  The government objected to this testimony, arguing
that: (1) it was irrelevant because the application of DOJ guidelines was not an issue in
the case, (2) the studies on the identification issue were relevant, not the DOJ Report; and
(3) Sanford had agreed not to reference the DOJ report.  The District Court, after noting
that neither the District Court nor the government had been put on notice that Dr.
Schooler would testify with respect to the DOJ Report, sustained the government’s
objection.  
7Based on our review of the record, we believe that Sanford has failed to
establish all three elements of the Mills test.  First, Sanford did not show that he was
deprived of the opportunity to present evidence in his favor.  The District Court provided
Sanford with ample opportunity to present Dr. Schooler’s testimony on the identification
issue.  Second, Sanford did not establish that this omission was material.  Third, the
District Court’s decision to exclude testimony on the DOJ Report was not arbitrary.  In
sustaining the government’s objection that the DOJ Report was not relevant, the District
Court also noted that Sanford failed to notify the District Court of his intention to
question Dr. Schooler on the DOJ Report.  Therefore, we conclude that Sanford’s Sixth
Amendment rights have not been violated and that the District Court did not abuse its
discretion.
III.   Denial of Request for a Jury View of Crime Scene
Sanford argues that the District Court abused its discretion in denying his
request for a jury view of the alleged crime scene.  Granting or denying a motion to view
is within the discretion of the district court.  Unites States v. Woolfolk, 197 F.3d 900,
905-06 (7th Cir. 1999) (citation omitted).  In making its decision on a motion to view, a
district court weighs “a variety of factors involving the fair and efficient conduct of a
trial.”  Id. at 906 (citation omitted).  We review the District Court’s decision to deny the
motion to view only for abuse of discretion.  Id. at 905-06 (citation omitted).
On April 7, 2004, in a memorandum and order, the District Court denied
8Sanford’s motion for jury view of the alleged crime scene.  The District Court reasoned
that Detective Price’s testimony regarding October 29, 2002 was not a critical component
of the government’s case, that Detective Price’s observation of Sanford was not limited to
October 29, 2002, and that Sanford’s attempt to undermine Detective Price’s alleged
observation could be accomplished through videotape or photograph evidence.  Based on
this reasoning, the District Court concluded that the probative value of the jury view of
the alleged crime scene was substantially outweighed by the potential for confusion of the
issues, undue delay and redundant nature of the evidence.
Sanford believes this jury view was necessary in order for the jury to make
an informed decision regarding Detective Price’s ability to identify Sanford from his
vantage point.  At trial, Sanford presented an expert who had videotaped the crime scene. 
The government challenged the videotaped evidence based on the expert’s failure to
replicate the conditions under which Detective Price observed Sanford.  Sanford argues
that the government’s challenge of his expert supports his contention that the jury needed
to visit the alleged crime scene.
We believe that the District Court did not abuse its discretion in denying
Sanford’s motion to view.  Based on the record, it is evident that the jury was presented
with ample evidence from which to make an informed decision regarding Detective
Price’s ability to identify Sanford on October 29, 2002.  Sanford’s expert’s failure to
replicate the conditions of identification is not the fault of the District Court.   
9IV.  Conclusion
Based on the reasons set forth above, we affirm the decision of the District
Court.
